Uchral Cabinet

Posted on April 3, 2026 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes and Marissa J. Smith

As we have done for cabinets since 2016 (Erdenebat 2016 | Khurelsukh 2017 | Khurelsukh 2020 | Oyun-Erdene 2021 | Oyun-Erdene 2022 | Oyun-Erdene 2023 | Oyun-Erdene 2024) | Zandanshatar 2025), we’re listing cabinet members below with their portfolios and brief bio sketches.

On the one hand, the change is a reshuffling. Amarsaikhan, former Deputy Prime Minister, is now Minister of Justice, and previous Minister of Justice B. Enkhbayar is now Cabinet Secretary. Several others also remain in key posts (Battsetseg, Batlut, Damdinnyam, Aubakir, Delgersaikhan). There are some returnees, notably Ch. Nomin, former Culture Minister, is now Minister for Innovation (Undral’s former Cabinet position), and L. Enkh-Amgalan has been returned as Minister for Education.

“Harvard Kids” and others associated with Oyun-Erdene’s government have been removed. Z. Mendsaikhan, who served as Minister of Agriculture and Light Industry in Khurelsukh’s Cabinet, is now back as Minister of Finance.

Except for Dorjkhand, Nomtoibayar, and new appointee to Energy Naidalaa (as power issues are a major concern), no non-MPP Cabinet members, and all new Cabinet members are MPs.

(new cabinet members in bold, if no party is listed in a bracket, the minister is from MPP)

Prime Minister – N Uchral
b. 1985 [found 1987 elsewhere] in Ulaanbaatar
Degree in law, Ikh Zasag International University, 2007
MBA, University of Gloucestershire, 2010
Mongolian University of Education, Master of History, 2012
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2013
General Director, Royal Academy and Royal International Institute, 2010-2016
Member of Parliament, 2016-Present
Minister of Digital Development and Communications, 2022
Cabinet Secretary, 2024-2025
MPP Party Chair 2025-
Speaker of Parliament 2025-2026

Deputy Prime Minister (Шадар сайд) – N. Nomtoibayar, MP (UE)
No. 1 and No. 45 schools, Ulaanbaatar, 1996
Bachelor’s Degree, Business Management, Valparaiso University, Indiana, 2001
General Security School, 2002
Master’s Degree, Engineering, Berlin, 2010
Employee, General Security Agency, 2001-2005 онд
Manager for Mongol Gold LLC (MAKh), 2005-2008
Employee, General Security Agency, 2008-2009
Vice President, Board of Directors, Mongol Gold LLC (MAKh), 2010-2012 Member of Parliament, 2012-2016
Deputy Minister of Social Welfare, 2012
Member of Parliament, 2016-2020
Minister of Social Welfare, 2016-2017
Эрүүл мэндийн яамны сайдын үүргийг түр орлон гүйцэтгэгч, 2017
Head of the Undesnii Esvel coalition, 2024
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

Deputy PM for [no portfolio specified] – T. Dorjkhand, MP [KhUN – List]
Born 1977 in Ulaanbaatar
Bachelor in Public Finance, MUST in 1995
Master, Public Economic Policy, Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 2004
Trained in Public and Private Partnership in Infrastructure, Harvard University, USA, 2010
Trained in Financial Theory, Oxford University, UK, 2012
Specialist in the Fiscal policy in Ministry of Finance, 1999-2002
Intern in the Ministry of Finance in Japan, 2003-2004
Acting head, Loan and aid department, Ministry of Finance, 2005-2012
Head of the Financial policy and loan management department, Ministry of Finance, 2012-2015
Advisor to the Executive Director, Asia Pacific Region, International Financial Corporation, Washington, USA, 2013-2015
Co-founded the KhUN, headed the BOD, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-Present

Cabinet Secretary – B. Enkhbayar, MP
Graduated Law School of the National University of Mongolia, lawyer, 1998
Ulaanbaatar-Erdem University, teacher, 1998-2004
Assistant to the Member of Parliament,2000-2001
Reference and legal advisor to the MPP group in the Parliament, 2001-2002
Head of the Office of the Department of Land Relations, Geodesy and Cartography, 2003-2006
Head of the Department of State Administration and Management of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2006-2007
Head of the Office of the State Administration and Management of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2009-2011
Advisor to the MPP Chairman, 2011-2013
MPP group in the Parliament Advisor, 2014-2016
Deputy Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, 2016-2018
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Justice of the Mongolian State Great Khural, 2023
Member of the Government of Mongolia, Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, 2023
Member of the Mongolian State Great Khural, 2020-

Finance Minister (Сангийн сайд) – Z. Mendsaikhan, MP
Born 1979, Myangad soum, Khovd Aimag
Attended 10-year middle school in Myangad, Khovd
Institute of Finance and Economics of Mongolia 2001, Management Academy 2006-2008
Executive director and director-general of a private company 2001 – 2014
Department Manager and Director of “Monkhangai House” LLC 2001-2003 Executive Director of “Durvun Uul” LLC 2003-2004
Executive Director of “Meeg” LLC 2004-2013
Executive Director of “MTM” LLC 2013-2015
Head, Budgetary Investment Directorate, Ministry of Finance 2015-2016
State Secretary, Ministry of Energy 2016 – 2019
Minister of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry, 2020-2022
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2022-2023
Advisor to the President of Mongolia on urban and rural development, 2024
Мember of Parliament, 2024-Present

Defense (Батлан хамгаалахын сайд) – D. Batlut, MP
Born 1974
Employee, “Erdenet Carpets” LLC, 1994-2000
Executive Director at “World Vision Mongolia” International Organization, 2003-2006
Deputy Governor of Bayan-Ondur soum, Orkhon aimag, 2008-2012
Representative, leader, and group leader of the Orkhon aimag Local Government Committee, 2008-2020
Governor of Orkhon Aimag and Mayor of Erdenet City, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-2024 (Orkhon [Erdenet])
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Bulgan/Khuvsgul/Orkhon)

Justice (Хууль зүй, дотоод хэргийн сайд) – S. Amarsaikhan, MP
Born 1973, Nalaikh, Ulaanbaatar
Linguist and Lawyer, Fresno College (California) 1996;
English Metropolitan College, 1998
Los Angeles College, 2000
Master’s degree in law from Southwestern University
Staff at Science and Information Technology Center 1992-1994
Attache at the Embassy of Mongolia to PRC, 2000-2004
Manager of Investment and Foreign Trade at American Trade and Development, 2004-2007
CEO, President and Director of BOD, Oyunii Undraa Group LLC, 2007-2017
Member of the Citizen’s Representative Council, 2012-2020
Head of the budget, finance and economic committee of the Citizen Representative Council, 2016-2017
Chairman of the Citizen’s Representative Council, 2017-2019
Mayor of Ulaanbaatar, 2019-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-Present
Deputy Prime Minister, 2021

Education (Боловсролын сайд) – L. Enkh-Amgalan, MP
Born 1970 in Khuvsgul; graduated secondary school in Murun
Economist and IT Engineer, Graduated from the University of Saint Peterburg in 1992; Dakota University [sic] in USA the in 1996; and Hangdon University in 2002
Director-General of Interpress LLC 1995-1996
Editor in Chief at Il Tovchoo Newspaper, Montsame Agency 1992-1995
Vice President of MCS Group, Board of Directors of Unitel Group 1996-2012
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia, 2011-2012
Member of Executive Committee of the MPP, 2012-Present
Member of Parliament since 2012-Present
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science, Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural, 2016-2017
Deputy Speaker of the State Great Hural 2017-2020
Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Structure of the State Great Hural from 2020
Minister of Education and Science, 2021-2024

Roads and Transport (Зам тээврийн хөгжлийн сайд) – B. Delgersaikhan, MP
Born in 1964, Dornogobi
Bachelor in law, University of Law Enforcement, 1987
Detective, Dornogobi Police Unit, 1987-1989
Lead detective and Head of the unit, Police Office of Dornogobi, 1989-2002
Founder and director of “Dorniin Gobi” LLC, 2002-2016
Director, “Bold tomor Eroo gol”LLC, 2004-2015
Member of Parliament (three terms), 2014-2020, 2020-2024, 2024-Present
Minister of Roads and Transport, 2024-

Culture, Sport, Tourism and Youth Minister (Соёл, спорт аялал жуулчлал залуучуудын сайд) – J. Aldarjavkhlan, MP
No. 50 School, 1995
English study in Australia, 1998
Master’s in accounting, National University of Mongolia, 2005
Advisor, Finance Ministry, 2006-2008
Governor, Khan-Uul District, Ulaanbaatar, 2016-2024
Member of the Mongolian Parliament, 2024-Present

Environment and Climate Change (Байгаль орчин, уур амьсгалын өөрчлөлтийн сайд) – Ts. Sandag-Ochir, MP
No. 66 School, Baganuur, 1995
Management Academy, 2001
Deputy Head of MPP Party Branch, Baganuur, 2005-2008
Governor of Baganuur District, Ulaanbaatar, 2008-2012
Head of MPP Party Branch, Baganuur, 2012-
Management Academy, Master’s Degree, 2018
Governor of Baganuur District, Ulaanbaatar, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2020-Present
Head, Standing Committee on State Structure, Parliament of Mongolia, 2025-

Foreign Relations (Гадаад харилцааны сайд) – B. Battsetseg, MP
Born in 1973 in aimag center of Bayankhongor province
Graduated secondary school, Darkhan
Graduated from International Relations School at MUST in 1996
Directors of publishing houses Az Khur LLC, and Munkhiin Useg LLC 1996 to 2004
Institute of Finance and Economy 2000; Maastricht University of Management in 2005
Unit Director at Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency, 2005-2007
Chairman of the board, Munkhiin Useg 2007-2015
Advisor to MPP Secretary-General, 2010-2011
Administration office, and Head of Foreign Relations and Cooperation Department of MPP, 2010-2012
Director of the Board of Directors of Munkhiin Useg Publishing, 2020 to Jan 28, 2021
Advisor to the Minister of Finance, 2015-2016
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2021-present
Member of Parliament, 2024-present

Mining and Industry (Аж үйлдвэр, Эрдэс баялгийн сайд) – G. Damdinnyam
Born 1982
First Mongolia Focus co-author to become member of cabinet
Darkhan-Uul aimag secondary school No. 7, graduated 1999
Mongolian University of Education, teacher of sociology and law, 2004
Mongolian University of Education, master of political science, 2005-2007
University of British Columbia, master of mining governance and policy, 2013-2016
Advisor to the Minister of Environment, 2008-2009
Advisor to the Minister of Higher Education, 2009-2010
Vice-Rector of Social Development, Mongolian University of Science and Technology, 2010-2013
Researcher at the University of British Columbia, Canada, 2015
CEO of “Procon Mining Mongolia” LLC, 2017
Member of Parliament, 2020-

Family, Labor and Social Protection (Гэр бүл, хөдөлмөр, нийгмийн хамгааллын сайд) – T. Aubakir, MP
Born 1976
Secondary school of Tsagaannuur soum, Selenge aimag, 1992
“Otgontenger” Higher School, International Law, 2000
Deputy Director of “Selenge Tariya” LLC, Selenge aimag, 2000-2005
Director of “Tarian Tsatsal” LLC, 2006-2015
Head of the Internal Audit and Monitoring Department of the General Department of Customs, 2015-2016
Deputy Head of the Buyant-Ukhaa (International Airport) Customs Department under the General Department of Customs, 2017-2019
Member of Parliament, 2020- (Bayan-Ulgii)

Construction and Urban Development (Хот байгуулалт, барилга, орон сууцжуулалтын сайд)– E. Bat-Amgalan, MP
Born 1977
Secondary School No. 1 of the capital, 1994
Department of International Relations, German Studies, International Diplomacy, National University of Arts, 1998
Law School of the National University of Arts, Lawyer, 2004
“Bayan Hadat” Tour LLC, Executive Director, 2002-2008
Head of the Production and Services Department of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2008-2010
Representative of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2008-2012
Deputy Head of the National Parks Department, 2010-2012
Head of the Foreign Relations Department of the “Chinggis Khaan” International Airport of the State Administration of Tourism, 2015-2020
Representative of the Capital City Tourism and Tourism Administration, 2016-2020
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Bayanzurkh district of Ulaanbaatar)

Health Minister (Эрүүл мэндийн сайд) – E. Batshugar, MP
Born 1987
son of former President N. Enkhbayar
Ulaanbaatar School No. 14, 1994-2000
Bentley University, USA, 2004-2008
Employee, JP Morgan, 2008-2010
Director, Sod Margad Company, 2011
Mongolbank Vice President, 2012-2016
Chairman of Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (party since merged with MPP)
Member of Parliament, 2024- (Songinokhairkhan district of Ulaanbaatar)

Food, Agriculture and Light Industry Minister (Хүнс, хөдөө аж ахуй, хөнгөн үйлдвэрийн сайд) – Ts. Iderbat, MP
Undurkhaan, Khentii province high school, 1998
English language teacher, Foreign Languages School, 2003
Management Academy, 2007
Employee, MPP Branch, Khentii province, 2003-2008
Kherlen soum governor’s office, 2008-2012
Deputy Director, MPP Branch, Khentii province, 2012-2016
Governor of Kherlen soum and director of Chingis [Undurkhaan] City, 2016-2020 онд
Governor, Khentii province, 2020-2021 онд
Member of Parliament, 2021-Present

Energy (Эрчим хүчний сайд) – B. Naidalaa, MP (KhUN)
No. 23 School, Ulaanbaatar, 1993
Business degree, СЭЗДС, 1997
Master’s degree, Economics and Development Economics, Kobe University, 2004
Economist and director, Anod Bank, 2004-2007
Director at Khaan Bank, 2007-2008
Director at Unitel, MCS Group, 2008-2011
General director and secretary, Mongolian Banking Association, 2012-2015
Head of KhUN Party and member of party committee, 2016-2024
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present
Head of Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Development, 2025-Present

Digital Development, Innovation and and Communications (Цахим хөгжил, инноваци, харилцаа холбооны сайд) – Ch. Nomin, MP
Born 1983, Ulaanbaatar
Daughter of Chinbat, Director of Gatsuurt Company (gold mining and agriculture)
University of East Anglia in 2003, Economics and Accounting 2006;
Director of External Relations of the Gatsuurt Group, 2006-2007
Manager, Terelj Hotel (owned by Gatsuurt), 2007
Director of “Terelj Suikh” LLC 2008-2011;
Harvard Business School 2018;
Executive Director of Mongol TV 2011-2021
Minister of Culture, 2021-2025
Member of Parliament, 2024-Present

(References include Alan J. K. Sanders, The Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017, Ikon.mn and parliament.mn)

Posted in Government, KhUN, Mongolian People's Party, National Coalition, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Is Mongolia not Backsliding?

Posted on March 25, 2026 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

[You might also be interested in The Great State Mural’s episode on global indices to complement the discussion below.]

Last year, it was certainly noted in Mongolia that the country had fallen from the status of an “electoral democracy” to an “electoral autocracy”. With 2025, Mongolia is back among the ranks of electoral democracies (see p. 15 of V-Dem’s “Democracy Report 2026” (PDF)).

Cause for celebration?

 

Post by @jdierkes@sciences.social
View on Mastodon

 

I’m referring to a post I had published last year that reported on conversations regarding self-censorship that I had in Ulaanbaatar last Spring to make sense of a continued slide in democracy rankings that did not make sense to me given little change in legislative or structural political factor.

To make substantive sense of the uptick, let’s look more closely at subcomponents, i.e. the five different democracy indices that V-Dem provides.

2015 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Deliberative Democracy 0.56 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.4 0.45
Egalitarian Democracy 0.53 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.38
Electoral Democracy 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.5 0.54
Liberal Democracy 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.42
Participatory Democracy 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.28

I have included the values for 2015, and 2020-2025 here. This marks the decline of most values that started in 2019, as well as the opportunity to offer 5- and 10-year comparisons.

10-Year Trend

If we look at the ten year trajectory it is definitely negative. Regardless of the magnitude of year-to-year changes, we thus can concluded that democracy along the five dimensions is less solid now that it was ten years ago. One might note in this context that the MPP has been in government since the 2016 elections and that the DP has been actively self-destructing since around then, despite Pres. Battulga electoral victory in 2017. The only significant democratization in this period was the 2017 initiative toward deliberative polling by current PM Zandanshatar, though this has had no real long-term impact. At the same time, there have been no major crises of democracy, I would argue, on the scare of the 2008 fatal riots, for example. The parliamentary elections during this time (2016, 2020, 2024) were fascinating for many reasons, but I witnessed the 2016 and 2024 election in country, observing the campaign as well as the election, itself, but I am not sure that they were particular markers in terms of democratization. Yes, electoral systems changed every time, but less or more democracy? If yes, then only marginally, I would argue. For example, the creation of regional election districts in 2024 coupled with the short campaign period has surely raised barriers for independent candidates or small parties, but an overall decline in the quality of democracy?

Over this period it is clear, however, that the perception of democratic participation and opportunities has deteriorated.

5-Year Trend

What about the 5-year trend then? Over this period as well, all five subindicators are down. Deliberative democracy least, liberal democracy most (numerically and in percent). The liberal democracy indicator is perhaps easiest to make sense of with its emphasis on civil liberties. As I wrote last year, contacts are increasingly reporting that they are self-censoring. There also have been several incidents of arrests of demonstrators or journalists (for example the noorog.mn case). These indicate a sense of reduced freedoms, especially significant as many Mongolians’ sense of democracy is focused more on freedoms and personal liberty than collective deliberation, perhaps. Deliberative democracy measures inclusion of multiple views in the policy-making process, by contrast, and little has changed in that regard.

Recent Developments

Whenever anyone is politically wronged in Mongolia, they quickly reach for “demise of democracy” arguments. This has been going on for years and we have discussed several such moments on this blog over the years. Is Pres. Khurelsukh’s proposed legislation for the recall of MPs a real threat to democracy? Perhaps not directly, but along with previous developments, perhaps this is death by a thousand cuts?

In short, I continue to think that the decline since 2019 overstated threats to democracy, but this last year’s score also does not capture any real changes. That leaves the question of what’s driving this shift in scores.

Events and Substantive Changes to Democracy

For an explanation, as a Mongolia specialist, I try to think about factors as I did in last year’s post. What might have driven this year’s uptick could be the protests that proceeded the end of the Oyun-Erdene government and the peaceful transition of power from PM Oyun-Erdene to PM Zandanshatar through parliamentary means. For 2026, one might argue that the proposal to enable an easier recall of MPs by Pres Khurelsukh suggests an attempt to consolidate power and punish errant MPs, not a great democratizing initiative.

Methodology

An alternative place to look for an understanding of the changes in scores is methodology which is Kyle Marquardt‘s approach. He is involved in V-Dem at the central level, i.e. as a comparative politics specialists, while my involvement with the index is that of a country expert.

This post raises a several important questions about the @vdeminstitute.bsky.social indices that I’ll try to discuss broadly, then specifically in the case of Mongolia.

Important caveat: I am not a Mongolia expert, so can’t speak substantively about the case; I can discuss the V-Dem methodology.

[image or embed]

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

One of characteristics that distinguishes V-Dem from some other efforts is methodological care. In many ways, of the multitude of global indices that have sprung up over the past decades, it is the most academic.

Confidence

The first point is that all of the V-Dem democracy indices include a measure of statistical uncertainty in addition to our best estimate of the concept. That is, we provide a range of plausible values for each country-year level of democracy. The shaded area around each line shows this range.

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

The inclusion of measures of uncertainty is one of the markers of V-Dem. In coding, I’ve very much appreciated the opportunity to estimate a factor, but to “admit” that I am not as sure of that factor as others that I am very confident on. If we take the subindicator that has declined most, liberal democracy, and compare the 2020 and 2025 values, 0.52 and 0.42, then note that the confidence interval (the shaded area, Marquardt refers to) stretches from 0.47-0.58, for 2025 this ranges from 0.36-0.47. The lowest plausible value within the confidence interval in 2020 includes the highest plausible value in 2025. Yet, the consistent trend over time is also suggestive, even given confidence ranges.

These credible intervals are important bc they reveal in which country-years we’re more or less confident about a value, with wider intervals indicating more uncertainty. More uncertainty can be due to multiple factors, from expert uncertainty to different values for index components…

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

Without listing the values individually, the ranges for the subindicators have remained stable over the 5-year period.

They’re also important because they help determine if a change is substantial or not. For example, how confident are we that electoral democracy in Mongolia increased btw 2024 and 2025?

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

Since the confidence bands stayed relatively stable across the indicators over this period, it does not seem to me like there are significant differences in confidence of annual score changes. The confidence in the decline of 2023-2024 is thus not particular greater or lesser than that in the uptick 2024-2025.

In 2024, the level of electoral democracy in Mongolia was .50, with a credible interval of .44 to .56; this indicates that we’re 68% certain the value of electoral democracy was within this range. In 2025, the equivalent statistics were .54 (.47, .60).

[image or embed]

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

This is a more precise version of what I commented on above in terms of the confidence bands.

As a rough heuristic, the substantial overlap in the two ranges (.44, .56) and (.47, .60) indicates that we have a relatively low level of confidence that there was a meaningful increase in the level of electoral democracy in Mongolia between 2024 and 2025.

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

I find this interpretation quite telling, particularly since Marquardt is directly involved in V-Dem and thus knows the data very well. This also reinforces my own sense that I am much more interested 5-year or 10-year trends when it comes to a single case, Mongolia, than I am in annual changes, though media reporting begs comment on the annual changes.

On the other hand, in 2015 the level of electoral democracy in Mongolia was .69 (.61, .75), which does not overlap with the range in 2024 (.44, .56). This lack of overlap indicates that we can be confident there was a meaningful decrease over that period.

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

Bingo! The ten year trend!

Specific Trends

The second point, as Dan mentioned in another thread, is that V-Dem indices include a lot of information about different concepts. The use of indices is useful for understanding broad trends, but not as helpful for understanding the specifics of these trends.

[image or embed]

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

The general point here, “useful for broad trends, less so for specifics” is similar to my conclusion that I prefer 5/10-year trends. I would say, however, that as a country specialist I am interested in specifics of these trends. It is an understanding of these specifics that enables use of these indices beyond the important academic variable they provide for crossnational comparison, i.e. benchmarking or accountability. If I take dedication to democracy among Mongolian officials at face value (I have little reason not to), then I might imagine that they might be interested in how Mongolia measures up.

To understand the specifics of the trends, it’s useful to drill-down into specific indices. For example, all V-Dem democracy indices include electoral democracy as an integral component. As a result, similar trends across these indices could just be due to electoral democracy decreasing…

[image or embed]

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

I would believe that there is a bit of “pollution” of different variables across the different components that make up these indices. If something really terrific happens on a particular issue (imagine some significant victory in a freedom of speech case, for example), it seems plausible that experts will be in a more positive “mood” regarding democracy overall. There are lots of factors that guard against that in the V-Dem methodology (precise focus on particular questions, vignettes to assess an overall general understanding of a topic/question, etc.). In correspondence with Staffan Lindberg who is Director of the V-Dem Project at the Univ of Gothenburg, last year, I learned about the “bad vibes bias” as a technical term for what I am describing here. He pointed me to “Conceptual and Measurement Issues in Assessing Democratic Backsliding” as a detailed examination and discussion of the risks of susceptibility to biases. Both, Marquart and Lindberg were co-authors of that analysis. For anyone who is interested in a very thorough analysis of biases in the V-Dem data, this is a fascinating read. Importantly, the analyses across V-Dem scoring find no evidence for a bad vibes bias, or the claim that “experts have been increasingly negatively biased due to pessimism about the state of democracy” (in the above article).

The evidence across all scores seems quite convincing, yet, my close focus on a single case still has me wondering…

Here I’ve disaggregated the democracy indices into their component indices (i.e. the unique aspect of each democracy index, and electoral democracy on its own). They all seem to show a similar pattern 2015-2025: a decrease btw 2015 and 2024, followed by an uptick in 2025. However…

[image or embed]

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

…all of the components are marked by high uncertainty, and the rate and extent of change varies substantially. Electoral democracy shows the greatest degree of change btw 2015 and 2024, which could further explain some of the similarity in changes in all the indices in this period.

— Kyle Marquardt (@kailmarkvart.bsky.social) March 19, 2026 at 9:28 AM

It is in part this disaggregation that makes me wonder. Following Mongolian events closely, I know that my own scores for V-Dem have not changed much, because I do not see a lot of concrete changes, mostly “bad vibes”. As I discussed in my post on self-censorship, those bad vibes may well be adding up to changes in the practice of democracy by not actually restricting free speech (the kind of legislative change that would be privileged in other indices like Freedom in the World, for example), but rather not only the practice of free speech by potential political speakers, but also the perception of the state of freedom of speech. Even if that is the case, these bad vibes may well be dragging down the scores on other specific elements in the disaggregation that actually have little to do with free speech, for example. I am less concerned with global bad vibes in this case, more concerned about bad vibes within the crew of Mongolia experts, in part due to our/their narrow focus on a single case which can make it difficult to make judgements in a comparative context.

I tried to reflect on this already years ago in acknowledging my perhaps somewhat overly-optimistic views of Mongolian democracy. The challenge of providing a thorough assessment of the current state of affairs in Mongolia while also acknowledging that democracy remains fundamentally sound (in my judgement), particularly in comparison to many other jurisdictions remains real. I do think that even when I feel compelled to comment on annual changes because these appear in the media, a strict analytical focus on longer-term developments guards against that somewhat.

Posted in Democracy, Global Indices, Politics | Tagged | Leave a comment

Podcast: The Great State Mural – Mongolia Portrayed

Posted on March 18, 2026 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Mongolia Focus has spawned an audio cousin and we’ve made it all the way past Episode 20 on a roughly bi-weekly schedule which prompts me to want to let readers know about this project.

With Dolgion Aldar and Anand Tumurtogoo I started the podcast earlier last summer, “The Great State Mural – Mongolia Portrayed“. The hope is to continue to offer analyses of current developments and also address some deeper questions about contemporary Mongolia. We also bring on occasional guests. All in all, not unlike Mongolia Focus, but a different format and somewhat more conversational.

As with Mongolia Focus, The Great State Mural is freely accessible, but welcomes support. As a bonus, we offer occasional extra mini add-on episodes to supporters.

Hopefully you can find the podcast on your favourite podcatcher and if you must, you can also listen via larger platforms like Spotify. Here’s the Apple Podcasts version:

Posted in Podcast, Reflection, Research on Mongolia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mining and Magnetism: The Repulsion Effect

Posted on February 18, 2026 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

Last month I attended Julian’s talk at Humboldt University of Berlin, “The Mongolian State and the Magnetism of Natural Resources.”

In the talk, Julian posed the question of how the presence of “natural resources” influence the shape and course of democratization and economic development in countries like Mongolia.

The concept that Julian created, that “natural resources” generate “magnetic fields,” sparked my imagination right away. In his talk, Julian gave a comprehensive review of mining projects in Mongolia and their place in the Mongolian imaginary of national development: Nalaikh as the foundation pit of the Mongolian working class, Erdenet as the modernist “milk cow,” and Oyu Tolgoi as the uncertain and contested present and future. As he demonstrated, the “magnetism” of natural resource projects has profoundly shaped Mongolia’s historical path, making it anything but a linear course of prosperous ascendance.

While the primary association with magnets might be “attraction” (in the case of Mongolian mining, international investors, researchers, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and infrastructure projects), the “magnetism of mining” concept provoked me to consider how magnets and magnetic fields also produce “repulsion” (specialization, geopolitical pressure, and infrastructural restraints).

Fields of Mining Magnetic Repulsion
(Created using Gemini 3 and Freepik)

As Julian invited me to reflect on after his talk, the long-term data from Erdenet provides a direct illustration of this magnetism in action. However, looking through the lens Julian has provided, I began to see not just the “attraction” of the modernist “milk cow,” but also the “repulsion” — the specialization and geopolitical pressures — that his framework brings into focus. Acknowledging the “repulsion fields” of mining projects makes possible a particular vision as to how they can drive development gains, at both the local or regional level as well as the national level. While Erdenet functions as the national “milk cow” Julian described, his magnetism framework helps me illuminate how that wealth is not just an input for the national budget, but the regenerative source of a multiplicity of networks maintaining the prosperity of certain groups while repelling “outsiders” who are not “attracted” in by particular types of social physics, at least some of which are particular to the Mongolian context (including the deliberate pacing of more “federalist” reforms in Mongolian governance that Julian noted in his talk).

In the past months, Julian and I have focused on the Prime Minister, the Parliament, and mining in Mongolia as “national” dynamics. We have also documented, however, how as the Prime Minister and the Party have narrativized crises that have (for now at least) “unhappened” as issues of central control in the present to direct development by investigating corruption, collecting revenue from mining projects, and attracting foreign investors, Mongolia’s present problems are also deeply historical and remain caught up in long-standing “force fields.”

Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

What Does the Rusal-Rio Case Actually Mean For Mongolia?

Posted on January 10, 2026 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

Coinciding with the December 2025 Oyu Tolgoi hearings, a Russian court decided for Rusal against Rio Tinto in the case of a $1.32 billion lawsuit around a joint alumina refinery in Queensland that Rio took sole control over after Australian sanctioned Russia due to its Invasion of Ukraine.

I have encountered Mongolia-watchers scratching their heads. The case concerns a collapsed joint project in Australia. But could it have to do with Oyu Tolgoi? Is the event’s alignment with the Oyu Tolgoi Hearings significant?

The elephant (or perhaps, Siberian Brown Bear) in the room is Russia’s aggressively leaning into the geopolitical reordering that has followed the COVID-19 crisis. The “aggressive lean in,” of course, is most obvious in the form of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, from the perspective of Mongolia, recent events including:

  • power plant and grid failures,
  • continuing fuel shortages due to Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries,
  • conversations around outfitting Ulaanbaatar’s ger districts with fixtures for Russian gas,
  • and a “pilot plan” with the Eurasian Economic Union that exempts almost 90% of Russian exports to Mongolia from duties that was “silently” approved by the Ikh Khural in mid-December

all demonstrate that Russia is keeping Mongolia in its fold. Isee.mn reports that the EAEU deal may reduce Mongolia’s GDP growth by about 6.1 percent and, according to a study by the National University of Mongolia, Mongolian domestic production could decrease by 18 percent due to increased industrial imports.

As reported by Reuters, the case was a re-litigation by a Russian court after a decision had been made by an Australian court. As I have heard others point out, it seems unlikely that the Russian side will be able to collect their claim. I concur, but would emphasize that collecting damages from Rio Tinto is not the point. The point is Russian state entities reinforcing and “claiming” deepening divides with (so-called) “Western” countries like Australia. As the Reuters article notes, initially Rusal was sanctioned by Australia after the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine, and additionally, the “re-litigation” (redefinition of who is calling it quits upon whom) coincides with Rusal acquiring stakes in alumina refineries in China and Russia since 2023. It is significant that at least one Mongolian commentator is concerned that Russia might continue by pressing countries with stake in Rio projects, including Mongolia, to provide “compensation” for the loss in Queensland.

(And, a shout out to Robert Ritz’s Lexica News service for helping me stay up-to-date on Mongolian reporting!)

Posted in Energy, Infrastructure, Mining, Mongolia and ..., Politics, Russia | Tagged | Leave a comment

Mongolia Focus in Review 2025

Posted on January 5, 2026 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

It was a big year for the blog because we moved from the original home at the Univ of British Columbia to our own domain as I moved from UBC to the University of Mannheim.

This move has disrupted traffic flows somewhat as search engines make the adjustment to the new location because we have not wanted to take down the old site entirely since there will be many readers who will have been used to the old URL. Judging by the analytics, it seem that traffic really started picking up to the new URLs late in the Fall to reach levels that are comparable to those before the move (but after the evil Twitter takeover that might me quit that platform)

As a reminder to readers, you can fine me on Mastodon and Bluesky where I regularly post, including posts about new blog posts. Mongolia Focus is also on LinkedIn and we send notifications about new posts out via a WhatsApp channel.

Posts

We published 33 posts in the past year, Marissa and I wrote the majority of them, but this also included 10 guest posts. These posts brought us up to 892 posts in total since we started publishing in the summer of 2021. Extrapolation would point to 2027 with its presidential election as the year that we pass the 1,000-post milestone, since we are typically more active during election years.

Among the posts have been some “service posts” like our bios of Zandanshatar cabinet members. Marissa also wrote a really handy glossary of the MPP that helped us (and hopefully readers) analyze several (near)crises of government.

In the long run, I imagine that my attempts to understand changing V-Dem scores on academic freedom may prove to be the most significant to inform future analyses (mine, but hopefully also others). V-Dem also spurred me to write on self-censorship which also seems like it is a lasting feature of Mongolian democracy, if difficult to grasp empirically. Prior to these posts I also published a somewhat frustrated observation about all the things that I have seen repeating in Mongolian politics over the past 20 years without substantive change. I also could not help myself but note the display of toxic masculinity in much of Mongolian political imagery.

The post I probably enjoyed writing most was my musings about the origin of wooden fences.

You know those ubiquitous wooden board fences in urban areas of #Mongolia, right? How can they be so common?
mongoliafocus.com/2025/08/orig…

[image or embed]

— Mongolia Focus (@mongoliafocus.bsky.social) August 25, 2025 at 3:43 PM

Marissa also followed this up with her thoughts on egg cartons. Of course, these posts are more musings than analyses, but our position as regular, but intermittent visitors to Mongolia allows us to share some such observations on occasion. In this vein, a Spring visit also allowed me to continue my observations of changes in Ulaanbaatar and in the countryside.

Of course, analyses of the shift from PM Oyun-Erdene to Zandanshatar and subsequent permutations were the focus of a plurality of our posts.

Oh, and no LLM models have been used in the writing of any of my posts, neither for content nor for style!

Readership

Assessing readership has been complicated somewhat by the migration of Google Analytics to a new format, a migration that I have not – honestly – fully understood. For my lack of understanding, the pre-migration and post-migration numbers are not added up, so everything has gone a little wonky.

New Analytics

Using the system that will supply analytics going forward (in operation since Apr 2025), I see a total of 14,000 pageviews (as of Dec 30 2025).

The root page is always the most visited, followed this past year by:

  1. Zandanshatar cabinet (235)
  2. Helsinki Mongolian democracy photo exhibit (191)
  3. PM Zandanshatar (181)
  4. Oyun-Erdene Era (175)
  5. Mongolia Economic Forum (172).

What is very noticeable in this listing is that some of our older posts that have always received strong readership are not included which is probably due to the fact that they are enjoying a zombie existence on the UBC site.

Top ten origin countries of readers (well, there IP address anyway, I imagine) were:

  1. China (60%)
  2. U.S. (14.7%)
  3. Singapore (14.1%)
  4. Mongolia (8%)
  5. Germany (2.6%)
  6. Canada (2.3%)
  7. UK (2.1%)
  8. Australia (1.2%)
  9. Japan (1.1%)
  10. Netherlands (1%)

There are some significant changes from previous statistics in this. The share of pageviews from China is huge. As recently as 2022, this was 4%! Singapore has never featured in this listing before. I cannot help but wonder whether the site migration and analytics shift does not have something to do with this. Seems more plausible to me than a real shift in readership.

Old Analytics

The older tracking logged over 20,000 pageviews. That implies a total of over 34,000 pageviews which is in line with previous, non-election years.

In the most visited pages, some of our “evergreen” posts are making a stronger appearance here:

  1. Fascist symbolism in Mongolia (Me and Niels Hegewisch: 2020)
  2. Popularity of Russian (Bulgan: 2016)
  3. Discovery of Oyu Tolgoi (Byambajav: 2016)
  4. Nalaikh Mining Education Centre (Me and Mendee: 2018)
  5. Mongolia Scorecard (living listing)

The top ten origin countries show some surprising similarities and differences to those noted by the new system:

  1. China (61.7%)
  2. Singapore (24%)
  3. U.S. (10.3%)
  4. Mongolia (5%)
  5. Hong Kong (4.1%)
  6. Canada (3%)
  7. Germany (1.6%)
  8. UK (1.3%)
  9. Australia (1.1%)
  10. Vietnam (1.1%)
Posted in Reflection | Tagged | Leave a comment

Guest Post: Parliamentary Oyu Tolgoi Hearings: Key Themes and What We Often Misunderstand About Economic Benefit

Posted on December 23, 2025 by JDierkes

By Zorig Bat-Erdene

An ad hoc committee established by the Mongolian Parliament recently held hearings on the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) Investment Agreement, bringing together nearly 300 participants. Attendees included former presidents and prime ministers, current and former ministers and lawmakers, OT board members, executives, and mining-sector experts, all invited to share their perspectives and concerns.

Across several days of testimony, a consistent theme emerged: some frustration with how the agreement was negotiated and how key decisions have been made over the past 16 years. Particular concerns were raised regarding the “Dubai Agreement,” license transfers, high financing costs, governance and transparency shortcomings, elevated management expenditures, and – most prominently – the long delay in dividend revenues. Dividends were initially expected to be distributed starting in 2019, but now are projected to begin in 2041, contingent upon the full repayment of Mongolia’s project-related debt.

This debate carries national significance, as OT is one of the world’s largest copper deposits. The mine is currently ranked 12th globally and is projected to become the fourth-largest copper producer once underground operations reach full production, with annual output expected to reach approximately 500,000 tonnes starting in 2028, according to mining.com. Therefore, decisions made today regarding OT will shape Mongolia’s economic trajectory for decades, either expanding or constraining future opportunities. This underscores the importance of careful, professional, and technically informed renegotiation efforts.

One notable observation from the hearings was the heavy focus on the delay in dividend payments, with comparatively limited attention given to OT’s ongoing economic contributions. Dividends represent only one dimension of how value is generated and distributed in a large-scale mining project. A comprehensive assessment therefore requires a broader understanding of how Mongolia has already been – and continues to be economically impacted by the project. As noted by Julian Dierkes, sustained and iterative renegotiation efforts in key areas remain essential, as meaningful improvements could strengthen the overall agreement and potentially accelerate future revenues.

Importantly, large mining projects often generate substantial economic benefits before shareholder distributions begin—through employment, domestic procurement, tax and royalty payments, infrastructure investment, and long-term skills development. Recognizing these contributions alongside dividend expectations is essential for fostering a balanced, informed national discussion and helping the public understand the full potential of mining projects, thereby reducing the risk of similar challenges in future developments.

Understanding Dividends

Delayed dividends are not unique to Oyu Tolgoi (OT) or to Mongolia. In OT’s case, both the open-pit and underground developments were financed through loans raised by Rio Tinto from approximately 15 international banks and financial institutions. As with many large, capital-intensive mining projects, particularly block-caving operations, substantial upfront capital investment is required. Cost overruns during development are common and the results extended the debt-repayment period and, in turn, delayed the projected dividend timeline. However, the trade-off inherent in this mining method is that, once development and construction are complete, block caving delivers comparatively low operating costs over the life of the mine.

This financing structure is standard in global mining, where multi-billion-dollar underground projects often operate for decades before dividends are distributed. In this context, feasibility studies are not one-time blueprints but living documents that require periodic updates to reflect evolving technical, geological, and cost realities. In the case of Oyu Tolgoi, the feasibility study (Техник эдийн засгийн үндэслэл – ТЭЗҮ) is to be reviewed on five-year cycles, providing formal opportunities for the parties to reassess assumptions, address concerns, and negotiate necessary updates; however, it is not always clear whether comprehensive reviews and updates are consistently undertaken at each cycle by all parties.

What Is a Dividend?

A dividend is a distribution to shareholders that can occur only after a company has fully met its financial obligations, including:

  • operating and labour costs
  • taxes and royalties
  • debt service
  • capital expenditure
  • ongoing reinvestment requirements

Dividends vs. Broader Economic Benefits

During the hearings, dividends were frequently treated as the sole indicator of national benefit. In reality, OT has been delivering substantial economic value well before dividends became available. According to Rio Tinto, between 2010 and 2021, the OT project spent approximately USD 13.4 billion in-country spending, including wages, payments to domestic suppliers and contractors, taxes, and community contributions.

Employment

OT reports employment of over 20,000 workers, with 97% being Mongolian nationals. This provides immediate and stable household income and creates strong local and national economic multiplier effects.

Procurement and Local Business Development

Approximately 1,000 national and local suppliers and contractors provide goods and services to OT, making the project one of Mongolia’s largest drivers of domestic procurement and private-sector growth, where local economy has been diversified.

Taxes and Royalties

OT contributed USD 482 million only in 2024 and USD 371 million in 2023, and billions of dollars since 2010 through various taxes and royalties, forming a significant portion of Mongolia’s government revenue base and supporting essential government services.

Community Investment

The project supports education, skills training, infrastructure, and community-development initiatives in Khanbogd and across the South Gobi region USD 5 million annually and approximately USD 51 million since 2010.

Skills and Human Capital Development

OT has been training thousands of Mongolian professional and tradespeople while also building capacity within local contractors and suppliers. These skills remain in Mongolia regardless of ownership structure and represent a lasting national asset.

Comparing these benefits to dividends

Type When earned Who Benefits Scale Compared to Dividends
Employment Immediate & ongoing Households & national workforce, their families Larger in early years, and continued and stable employment opportunities
Procurement Immediate Mongolian domestic and local businesses Very large, diverse impact
Taxes & Royalties Immediate & recurring Government & public services Often exceeds early dividends
Skills Development Long-term National human capital Strategic national benefit
Dividends Long-term, after debt repayment Government (34%) Small compared to other direct benefits

Conclusion: Moving Beyond Criticism and Blame

Mongolia should not ignore dividend timelines or accept current terms without renegotiation. Strengthening key provisions, improving cost controls and financing structures, and safeguarding national interests remain legitimate priorities. At the same time, dividends represent only one element of the broader economic value generated by large-scale mining projects.

Reducing OT to a narrative of “fraud” oversimplifies a complex reality and risks obscuring both the benefits already delivered and the structural issues that genuinely require reform. Employment, domestic procurement, tax and royalty contributions, skills development, and community investments have generated substantial national value, even in the absence of dividend distributions to date.

Governance also matters. If Mongolia seeks greater influence at the executive level, it must first strengthen its representation at the board level by appointing qualified, experienced, and technically capable individuals rather than political or personal appointees to represent national interests.

With several major resource projects ahead, the lessons from OT, both successes and shortcomings must inform future negotiations. Criticism and blame alone will not improve outcomes; a balanced, informed understanding of how value is created and constrained in complex mining investments is essential to building stronger, more resilient agreements for future generations.

About Zorigtkhuu (Zorig) Bat-Erdene

Zorig Bat-Erdene is a mining procurement and supply chain professional. He holds a Master of Applied Science degree in Mining Engineering from the University of British Columbia, where his research focused on Mining Local Procurement (Local Content) in Mongolia. He continues to be passionate about finding sustainable solutions for the mining industry and improving the lives of local communities affected by mining.

Posted in Employment, Foreign Investment, International Agreements, Mining, Mining Governance, Oyu Tolgoi, Oyu Tolgoi, Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene | 1 Comment

Self-Censorship

Posted on December 4, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Seemingly, Mongolian democracy has been backsliding since 2019.

 

Post by @jdierkes@sciences.social
View on Mastodon

 

Shifts in the V-Dem indices are not huge, but noticeable and consistent. Mongolia now ranks as an “electoral autocracy” not a democracy. These shifts appear to be roughly in line with a degrading academic freedom index which I have discussed in more detail before. As I do with academic freedom, I have some doubts about what fellow experts are measuring with regard to democracy. But, I will shelve that question for another time.

Here, I want to to think about the corrosive impact that perceived repression may be having.

The Appearance of Self-Censorship

The complete freedom to ask and say what I want has been one of the aspects that I have really appreciated about Mongolia. I try to recognize the responsibility that comes with that freedom, for example by offering a discussion of transparency and independence to help readers develop criteria for their trust in my analyses. While I am free to research and write, I do try to offer some accountability to readers. But, I offer no accountability to corporate or government organizations.

I cannot reconstruct when it was mentioned to me for the first time that I should or should not talk about a particular issue in a public presentation, but I remember that I was  shocked.

When I spoke to others who are watching the state of democracy closely in April 2025, for example, self-censorship has become a big topic. Yes, everyone is free to say what they want, but some choose not to say some things that they would like to say for fear of repercussions.

Feared Repercussions

My immediate question to mentions of self-censorship is: “but, what are you afraid of?” The most common answers I receive to this is “online trolls” and arrest.

By comparison to all truly repressive regimes (including Mongolia’s immediate neighbours, obviously) those appear to be relatively mild sanctions, esp. when mention of arrest is almost always coupled with an expectation that arrest would only be brief. Yet, that does not mean that these are not sanctions that are driving behavior.

I also acknowledge that my surprise about the fear of speaking out comes on the backdrop of significant privilege in this context. I am neither a Mongolian citizen, nor do I live in Mongolia. I am employed at a German public university that offers very strong protection regarding academic freedom. The greatest risk I face is thus some kind of restriction on travel to Mongolia or activities in Mongolia, but those kind of restrictions seem quite far-fetched at this time.

Troll Armies

Yes, colleagues and acquaintances in Mongolia are actually afraid of online trolls. I am not questioning their fear, but rather expressing my surprise that online trollery has taken on such dimensions that it induces fear. The actions that people are afraid of include direct threatening language in posts and messages, and especially the spreading of false rumors that are disparaging or defamatory about a person, i.e. what I would call Rufmord – reputation murder – in German. This may well be the flipside of the observation that Mongolians are very much online, especially on Facebook, but large parts of the NGO, academic and policy world also remains active on what once was Twitter.

As an aside, I can only continue to urge Mongolians to abandon Twitter and move over to BlueSky, the most Mongolian-named social network imagineable, and a place where discourse remains civilized and safeguards for respect are stronger. Find me there at Mongolia Focus.

In this online world, several acquaintances have assured me that “troll armies” are regularly deployed in a targeted manner against particular individuals.

While many used to be concerned about foreign interference via social media, the present concern is much more focused on domestic political actors. It appears (from the patterns of targeting of individuals and particular issues/topics) that these kind of attacks are coordinated by political actors.

Note my very guarded language here. Because of the nature of fears of these actions, no one seems to be eager to publish evidence of such troll armies and their connection to particular political actors. I have not been subject to any such attacks, so I cannot directly speak to this issue, but the fears that are reported to me in this regard certainly seem very credible.

Vision 2050

I was even more surprised to hear from academics that they have been given the impression that they need to be extolling the virtues of PM Oyun-Erdene’s Vision 2050, though here as well, the nature of any sanctions is unclear to me. I can’t help but be reminded of the inane mentions of Xi Jiping I heard in “academic” presentations at the last Congress of Mongolists. Perhaps those activities will decline in salience now, half a year after the end of Oyun-Erdene’s time in office.

Arrests

There have been several instances of arrests at demonstrations and arrests of journalists (like the recent Noorog case) where the reasons for arrest have been very unclear, prosecution was either vague (“breaking national unity”) or did not result, making these arrests very much look like deliberate harassment. Yes, if no prosecution results, there is no direct harm, though I cannot imagine that remand cells are a joy to spend the night in, such arrests make for a lot of mental anguish, and they also do taint the person somewhat as subsequent non-prosecution is clearly not as noticeable as initial arrest is.

Why?

In considering reports of what seems like harassment, I do have to wonder what would prompt actors to pursue these kind of threats.

I have no insights into whether it is political leaders themselves who are initiating threats. But, if these threats are made (more obvious as in the cases of arrests), they are surely made with the knowledge of some such actors. What democratic political actor would consider threatening critical voices? None! I am left to conclude that those who are shown to be involved in such activities (again, most obviously in the case of arrests, those in charge, whether they have ordered actions directly or not) are not committed democrats and therefore should not hold public office in a democracy.

Implications

There are some catchy phrases that come to mind in considering the implications that self-censorship might hold for democracy.

“Democracy requires democrats” This phrase is generally attributed to Friedrich Ebert, Social Democrat and first president of the Weimar Republic until his death a hundred years ago this year. He is also namesake of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation which has been active in Mongolia for many years and with whom I have collaborated on a number of occasions.  Or, reversing this phrase, “no democrats, no democracy”. If critical voices are driven toward self-censorship, that means that democrats are falling silent which does pose a threat to democracy.

“Democracy dies in darkness” This is attributed to Bob Woodward, legendary journalist at the Washington Post which adopted the phrase as its slogan in 2017. What this phrase is often interpreted to mean is a plea for transparency and public examination to safeguard democracy. Again, if self-censorship becomes widespread, this safeguard deteriorates and threatens democracy itself.

As the sense of rising self-censorship is murky and anecdotal, it is not clear to me how I would recognize a turnaround in this regard, other than through reports of contacts. Various indices struggle with measuring the sense of oppression that comes through online attacks and even if the situation were to improve in this regard, it would take some rounds of scoring for the large indices to shift. As is the case with many democracies that are facing a populist right that is threatening some of the underpinnings of democracy, this is a time for Mongolian democrats to mobilize to protect what has been won.

Posted in Academia, Global Indices, Media and Press, Politics | Tagged | 5 Comments

The Zandanshatar Crisis that Unhappened (And What Happens Next?)

Posted on November 14, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes and Marissa J. Smith

Just a month ago, we thought we might have to revise our post with short bios of the current cabinet members in PM Zandanshatar’s cabinet. That still might happen with ongoing speculation about new individual appointments or even a shuffle, but the strong possibility of a new PM that loomed a month ago after Zandanshatar had only been in office for four months, seems to have passed … for now.

As so often, the circumstances that led to the resignation of D Amarbayasgalan as speaker, no-confidence motion against Zandanshatar, presidential veto, decision by constitutional court to overturn the no-confidence vote, remain somewhat opaque. And with the MPP General Assembly meeting happening at the end of this week, events are surely taking place to fill the now empty Speaker position, among others.

Somewhat unusually, however, there was less discussion, nay speculation on the alliances between individual politicians that may have been behind the events, more thinking about factionalism in the MPP more generally. Since this speculation has annoyed Julian in the past, perhaps good news if our perception is right.

Sequence of Events

To review, what happened?:

  • MPP Chairman Election, Amarbayasgalan elected over Zandanshatar (September 27-28)
  • Zandanshatar announces replacement of Minister of Justice
  • Signatures to remove Zandanshatar presented in Parliament
  • Standing Committee on State Structure recommends not removing Zandanshatar
  • Amarbayasgalan and Zandanshatar submit resignations (October 17)
  • Parliament votes to remove Zandanshatar (October 16- October 17)
  • Complaint submitted to Constitutional Court against process removing Zandanshatar
  • Khurelsukh vetoes Parliamentary decision to remove Zandanshatar (October 20)
  • Constitutional Court rules that removal was unconstitutional
  • Khurelsukh rescinds veto
  • B. Enkhbayar presented again as Minister of Justice (October 24)
  • ADB financing framework announced (November 4)
  • Kh. Bulgantuya removed from vice chairmanship of Ikh Khural (November 5)
  • 2026 Budget approved (November 13)
  • Demonstrations on square of doctors, бэрхшилтэй (recipients of disability payments) ongoing

Current state: Zandanshatar is PM, Kh. Bulgantuya (former deputy Speaker) and Amarbayasgalan (former Speaker) are now “rank and file” MPs, the sole deputy Speaker of Khural is Purevdorj (of the Democratic Party), the Speaker role is empty, and the new Minister of Justice is B. Enkhbayar, replacing Munkhbaatar.

Upcoming: While Amarbayasgalan had been elected as Party Chairman and was expected to be confirmed at the MPP General Assembly this week (November 15-16), he has now stated that he is withdrawing.

What Does it Mean

With his co-hosts, Julian also commented on the events as they unfolded on the “Great State Mural – Mongolia Portrayed” podcast, and Marissa co-authored a piece for The Diplomat.

Through the June replacement of Oyun-Erdene and the crisis that wasn’t, a couple of MPP actors have clearly lost some clout, most obviously Amarbayasgalan, but perhaps Bulgantuya as well. Not to say that either are out entirely, especially in a context where it seems to be factions rather that allegiance to individuals that is splitting the MPP, but they have been removed from symbolically at least important positions.

It is not clear that Zandanshatar’s position has really been strengthened. Yes, he was saved by the Constitutional Court and would have been saved by Khurelsukh’s veto, but that is unlikely to quiet the voices who were pushing for his dismissal. His announcement that he would not be seeking the party chairmanship is another signal that he remains in a relatively weak position within the party but perhaps also vis-a-vis parliament.

As has been the case in tumultuous situations in the past, it should be noted, that no specific substantive disagreements have emerged to fuel divisions. Yes, the teachers’ strike has been ended, but doctors are still striking. While a budget has just been passed, it includes substantial cuts (According to Montsame, “To offset the impact of increased spending, the 2026 budget introduces expenditure rationalization measures, including a reduction of MNT 990.17 billion in current expenditures and MNT 361.14 billion in capital outlays. Specifically, allocations for new equipment have been reduced by 50 percent, with resources redirected toward priority road transport and investment projects consistent with the objectives of the 2026 Development Plan of Mongolia.”). No faction has staked out a substantive position on any of these issues. Even corruption which has been a constant undercurrent from Oyun-Erdene’s dismissal through the current crisis, is not an area where factions or individuals are offering a different approach.

All that points toward overall policy stability which may well serve many people well, while in fact the MPP is still working to shore up divisions among its powerful members as the roles of Speaker and Party Chairman are to be filled. Stay tuned to Mongolia Focus for updates!

Posted in Government, Mongolian People's Party | Tagged | Leave a comment

How May Prime Ministers, Speakers, and MPs Be Removed?

Posted on October 15, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

In the past few days efforts have been underway in The State Great Khural to remove Prime Minister Zandanshatar (and his government) and Speaker of Parliament Amarbayasgalan. This follows Speaker of Parliament Amarbayasgalan’s ascension as MPP Chairman at the end of September. Prime Minister Zandanshatar had also contended for this role. His predecessor, L. Oyun-Erdene, was simultaneously PM and Party Chairman.

In this short post, I aim to explore potential legal bases of current efforts to unseat Zandanshatar (and that might be used to unseat Amarbayasgalan; the attempt from last week when signatures were gathered appears to have fizzled out for now at least). The current state of events as of October 15, 2025 is described in more detail in the latest The State Great Mural podcast episode here.

Removing a Prime Minister

According to The Law On The State Great Khural, Article 9, MPs may “propose the dismissal of the Prime Minister of Mongolia (hereinafter referred to as the “Prime Minister”) jointly with other members in accordance with Article 43, Part 1 of the Constitution of Mongolia” (8.1.11), i.e. if a majority of members support a proposal submitted by one-quarter of all members. According to news.mn, a third law stipulates that the Standing Committee on State Structure discuss and make recommendations before the final vote.

Removing A Speaker Of Parliament (Or An MP)

Additionally, according to The Law On The State Great Khural, Article 12, the Speaker may be removed if they are removed as an MP (according to Article 9), by a proposal submitted by a majority of MPs, or by the Constitutional Court. The removal is to be discussed by the Standing Committee on State Structure (Төрийн байгуулалтын байнгын хороо) and decided by an open vote. It is worth noting here that PM Zandanshatar is not an elected member of Parliament.

The Standing Committee On State Structure

The above mentioned article of the Constitution states:

“If at least one-fourth of the members of the State Great Khural formally submit a proposal to dismiss the Prime Minister, the State Great Khural shall begin deliberations within three days and make a decision within ten days. If a majority of all members of the State Great Khural support the proposal, the resolution of the State Great Khural on the dismissal of the Prime Minister shall be deemed adopted, and a new Prime Minister shall be appointed within thirty days.” (34.1)

A third law has been brought into play, The Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Session of the Parliament: “The Standing Committee on State Structure shall discuss the proposal to dismiss the Prime Minister at its session, issue opinions and conclusions, and present them to the plenary session” (101.2) before the final vote. A complete list of the 32 members of the Standing Committee on State Structure has been published by news.mn.

Zooming out, it is worth noting that, also according to The Law On The State Great Khural (Article 23), the jurisdiction of The Standing Committee on State Structure was expanded this past summer to include: “members’ declaration of assets and income,” “Order and maintenance of order in the session” and “Ethics, discipline and responsibility policy of civil servants.” (23.8.18-21) The law was also amended at this time to add subcommittees on Ethics and on the Immunity of Members of Parliament (27.3.3). 

Posted in Corruption, Government, Mongolian People's Party, Party Politics, Politics | Leave a comment

Khurelsukh and Pax Mongolica at the UN

Posted on September 26, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Pres. Khurelsukh’s speeches at the UN General Assembly have caught my eyes in recent years, in part because the UN has been the site of an at least symbolic battle between Russian President V Putin and the world over his aggression against Ukraine. Mongolia is caught up in that via its relations with Russia and China.

 

Sieh dir diesen Beitrag auf Instagram an

 

Ein Beitrag geteilt von Khurelsukh Ukhnaa (@ukhnaakhurelsukh)

Previous posts:

Pres Khurelsukh has continued his attendance streak to participate in the 80th general assembly, delivering his speech on Sept 23. A full text (“check against delivery”) is also available as a PDF.

Themes

The UN

Obviously, the UN has featured prominently in all of Khurelsukh’s speeches, as it did in Pres. Elbegdorj’ speeches, while Pres. Battulga was not so keen on attending/speaking.

And, on the 80th anniversary of the UN, how appropriate that Mongolia’s role in and connection to the UN featured prominently.

Following the historical introduction to the speech, Khurelsukh moved directly to Mongolia’s UN links, emphasizing peacekeeping in particular, as he should. He emphasized Mongolia’s efforts regarding the incorporation of women into peacekeeping troops pointing to their proportion in Mongolian forces as 14%.

The SDGs were the next item to be emphasized, including a reference to the Awaza Program of Action which I was not aware of. As this Program is focused on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), Khurelsukh returned to a focus that also appeared in his 2024 speech. The Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries had been set up in Ulaanbaatar more than 15 years ago as one of the most tangible links to the UN, but my sense is that there has not been a lot of action around the cooperation between landlocked countries recently.

The next UN touchpoint was the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Convention to Combat Desertification which Mongolia will be hosting next August.

Mongolian Culture

Of course, the Great Khaan cannot be missing from a speech like this. Here, he shows up right in the second full paragraph, as does the pax mongolica as a quasi-prototype. I am not a historian, but some of this language here, including “a period of remarkable progress and flourishing for humankind”, seems a bit hagiographic, but perhaps that is just sour European/conquered grapes…

Mongolian culture and heritage was generally a strong theme. The section that followed mention of Landlocked Developing Countries thus referred to that particular relationship with nature that Mongolians have and explicitly referred to the adoption of July 11 as World Horse Day by the UN in the context of the mid-summer celebration of Naadam.

Gender

Another section of the speech focused on women. Some of the highlights here were women peacekeepers, but also the World Women Entrepreneurs’ Forum and the increase of female representation in last year’s parliamentary election.

Absence

Whereas previous speeches by Khurelsukh had contained oblique references to Russian aggression or at least elements that could be read as such, there did not seem any kind of specific reference to the Ukraine conflict even in phrases surrounding the multilateral cooperation that the UN is focused on.

Posted in Landlocked Developing Countries, Mongolia and ..., Peacekeeping, UN | Leave a comment

2026 Budget Proposal: With Failing Infrastructure, Can Mongolia Pivot From Coal to Copper?

Posted on September 21, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

With the end of summer and the opening of the State Khural on September 15, the past few weeks have seen statements about economic policy coalescing into patterns.

These culminated this past week in still-new Prime Minister Zandanshatar‘s unveiling of his budget proposal, currently under discussion in the State Khural. A pitch to the public is exemplified in a Facebook post, stating that the budget includes “investment in the EDUCATION SECTOR to be increased by 2 times and the HEALTH SECTOR by 5.5 times,” specifying the construction of schools, kindergartens, dormitories, a cancer research center, and a cardiovascular center. (Meanwhile, a recent podcast episode by The Great State Mural highlights teacher shortages and low teacher pay as major concerns among the Mongolian population.)

However, at the same time, the Mongolian economy faces some major challenges and is being forced to attempt major pivots. As noted by over at Mongolia Weekly, the government is shifting focus from coal to copper. The Mongolian government’s revenues have been bolstered for several years (roughly since around the transition of power from Battulga’s to Khurelsukh’s administrations) on revenues from coal exports to China. As reported by Mining Insight Magazine, prices for Mongolian coal paid by China had fallen off by as much 30% as of fall 2024, and according to a summary presented with the 2026 budget proposal itself, prices had fallen by 40% in the first half of 2025, to the lowest price in the last 15 years.

Recent announcements by the government signaling attempts to increase gains from copper include:

While this plan is more cautious than the Fourteen Megaprojects of last year when Oyun-Erdene was still Prime Minister, it does have echoes of that scheme, and opening up new ore reserves and/or constructing a smelter at Erdenet would face many of the same challenges. Mongolia’s late-Soviet-built major infrastructure — from power and transport to essential urban utilities — is only aging and deteriorating. Recent news stories have stated that seventy percent of Mongolia’s infrastructure is past its expiry date. Over the summer, one of Ulaanbaatar’s power plants suffered a major fire, and is apparently still crippled even now going into the winter (reporting from mid-August includes statements that repairs would be finished before November 1). At the start of September, a substation in northern Mongolia failed following a major fire, causing even the Erdenet Mining Corporation to halt operations. In Ulaanbaatar, a US-funded project to help “stem the impact of an impending water crisis” has been safe from the Trump administration’s chainsaw — at least for now.

Posted in Economics, Education, Erdenet, Infrastructure, Mining, Policy, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 1 Comment

On Egg Cartons In Mongolia

Posted on September 5, 2025 by Marissa Smith

By Marissa J. Smith

Like fences, chickens (and their eggs) are seemingly “unnomadic” products. Also like fences, eggs are hardly unavailable in Mongolia, at least in urbanized areas and provincial centers.

A food shop, Egg Mart, with airag ger and khushuur shop in Erdenet, 2012.

A main course dish with eggs (өндөгтэй хуурга) in Erdenet, 2012.

While the domestic chicken (тахиа) does feature in the Mongolian twelve animal cycle, it does not of course feature among the “five snouts” or customary domestic livestock animals (horse, cow/yak, sheep, goat, camel). The Tsarist explorer Przhevalsky even wrote in his 1876 book, Mongolia, the Tangut country, and the solitudes of northern Tibet, being a narrative of three years’ travel in eastern high Asia, that:

“Fowl or fish they [Mongols] consider unclean, and their dislike to them is so great that one of our guides nearly turned sick on seeing us eat boiled duck at Koko-nor” (p. 57).

Nonetheless, according to figures from 1990, “The total population of farm birds is 376,000, 73 percent of which are found on state farms and 18 per cent on co-operative farms; 9.6 per cent are raised on subsidiary farms and by individuals.” (Information Mongolia, pg. 196). This may refer to egg-layers, with egg consumption being well established in northern Mongolian population centers, at least, by the early 2000s. As indicated by the messaging on the egg carton pictured below, eggs are considered healthy and nutritious (“For a healthy family,” эрүүл гэр бүлийн төлөө).

plastic egg carton

Mongolian egg carton, as shared in Facebook group for “Expats in Mongolia” 

Comment about use and reuse of Mongolian egg cartons, as shared in Facebook group for “Expats in Mongolia” by a user with a Mongolian forename

As indicated by this comment, in Mongolia eggs can also be purchased by the unit. I have been provided in this case with a small plastic bag, as also can be the case with yogurt, when it is distributed for sale, for transport by the consumer from the point of sale.

Posted in Agriculture, Cuisine, Curios | Tagged | Leave a comment

Origins of Wooden Fences

Posted on August 25, 2025 by JDierkes

By Julian Dierkes

Sometimes first-time visitors to Mongolia ask questions that I have also been asking myself, so leave me stumped and wondering.

One of these questions is the origin of the khashaa (Хашаа), or fence that demarcates a family’s property around their ger in an urban context.

These fences are ubiquitous in Ulaanbaatar as much as in provincial capitals and even soums. And, I mean ubiquitous as in really everywhere!

B Reichhardt has written a very brief note about the use of fences in Ulaanbaatar ger districts. K Brinkmann has photographed them.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Katja Brinkmann (@_katjabrinkmann)

Below I am trying to muse out loud about some of the origins of the specific version of the xashaa fence. If anyone has any different ideas or perhaps even more well-grounded information, I would absolutely welcome that. This is a little bit like my orange-turquoise puzzle that I thought about with NUM’s Munkh-Erdene, but that we did not really reach a conclusion on. Therefore, it might even be an idea for a dissertation topic!

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

Function

Two obvious purposes come to mind for these fences: keeping animals in, and keeping the elements and, perhaps, people and animals, out.

The counter-arguments are relatively clear, however. Obviously, Mongolian herders generally do not corral their animals except, for example, to sheer them or to catch horses to train them. So the idea of the wooden fence to contain animals seems to run somewhat counter to usual practice. However, perhaps it is the quasi-urban context where we see the fences that changes that practice? For example, in a soum centre, is a fence useful to keep animals that are about to be sold or moved somewhere else?

The one animal that might be kept in more obviously by a fence could be a dog. But there is little attention paid to dogs, their whereabouts and their well-being in the countryside, so this seems somewhat unlikely.

What about keeping animals out then? Again, when gers are sitting on the steppe somewhere, there is no obvious concern with animals coming close to the ger itself or to the cooking or slaughter areas that might be nearby. In an urban context, perhaps there is some utility in keeping herds out that are passing through, but is that enough of a need for one type of wooden fence to dominate across the whole country?

Maybe urban social distrust is at the root of the fence? These fences are not all that solid, so they would not really keep a determined animal or human out, but as gates typically have some kind of locking mechanism, there is some attention that is paid to the capacity of a fence to keep a property private and perhaps somewhat secure. If families might be leaving a property for months at a time as they are migrating, perhaps this modicum of security is enough to motivate some fences initially and they are subsequently copied by others?

In April 2025, I had a chance to meet up with National University’s Bayartsengel B who introduced me to the lovely new café at Dashchoilin Monastery near the university.

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Julian Dierkes (@jbdierkes)

This conversation pointed me in two directions for possible explanations. The first might be that the fences might be intended to keep someone out. But, Bayar countered that hospitality norms in the countryside are so strong, that gers would generally be left open for travellers to visit, so fences to keep travellers out or prevent theft would be an unlikely explanation. This might be different for nobles, however, where a fence might signal status. Monasteries may also have had enclosures initially as my check on Erdene Zuu photographs below suggests.

History?

But when did the wooden fence arrive? I’ve got Chris Atwood’s new translation of The Secret History of the Mongols on my desk and will have to check if wooden fences are mentioned anywhere in there, particularly given his discussion about the relative lack of prevalence of what we think of as a proto-typical ger today during the Imperial period. I would be surprised to find that wooden fences played a role in long-ago history.

One obvious thought, especially when traveling in northern Mongolia where small wooden houses are much more prevalent is: are wooden fences a Russian import?

As I was pondering this without really having much of an answer, part of a negative answer presented itself in a photobook on Erdene Zuu history that I picked up in Kharkhorin.

This book is not easy to find online, but I bought it at a gift shop at Erdene Zuu. Here is the entry from the National Library: Энх тунх Эрдэнэзуую.

Because the copyright and origin information about the photos reproduced in the book is very unclear, I do not want to simply reproduce the photos here. But, in several images that are marked “Archival photo, early 1900s”, there are wooden fences that divide different parts of the temple district around Erdene Zuu. These appear to look very similar to today’s xashaa fences, although they do appear to be a little taller and perhaps somewhat more orderly, that is, made of more regular planks. But, they are definitely planks that show some of the bark on (pine) trees, standing vertically, much like today’s planks.

These photos suggest to some extent at least that the xashaa look is not a Soviet import as “early 1900s” at a Buddhist monastery is likely somewhat removed from strong Russian influences.

My conversation with NUM’s Bayar also pointed me to Marzan Sharav’s “One Day in Mongolia” paintings. These are described in many places, including on lots of Mongolia tour company sites. Jamo Grand offers one such recent description. When you look at reproductions of the paintings (many available online), monasteries are clearly walled or fenced-in. The paintings are generally dated to the early 20th century, though not to an exact date. Either way, they seem to predate a pervasive Russian influence (while there was a Russian (trading) presence, of course), supporting my conclusion that the fences are not Russian in origin. Where gers are depicted as free-standing, i.e. not on temple grounds, they do not appear to be fenced-in. Perhaps that suggests that it was monasteries that were first fenced in in this fashion and that urban, i.e. less-nomadic gers may have subsequently adopted this. If that is the case, this might have been in the early days of the MPR. But, it would be surprising if these fences had become as ubiquitous as they are in only 100 years.

In the end, the fences thus remain a bit of a mystery to me…

Further Reading

For fascinating reading on other kinds of fences, see Zoljargal E’s visual anthropology essay:

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Dejid Emee (@z.o.l.l.y.gelato)

Posted in Countryside, Curios, Dissertation Ideas, Settlements, Ulaanbaatar | Tagged | 7 Comments

Guest Post: Back in Mongolia: Buzz, Ambition, and a Bold Vision at MEF 2025

Posted on July 21, 2025 by JDierkes

By Zolzaya Jargalsaikhan

After two years abroad, my family and I have safely returned to Mongolia — just in time for the Mongolia Economic Forum (MEF) 2025. The energy was palpable — not only from reconnecting with family and friends, but also from the distinct buzz in the business and policymaking communities, the buzz that can be felt only in emerging markets.

Having been part of the MEF organizing team in past years, I understood the strategic effort that goes into programming this forum. That’s why I made it a priority to attend as soon as we landed.

MEF has long served as the go-to platform for understanding Mongolia’s socio-economic landscape — and this year was no exception. Taking place immediately after the 2024 parliamentary elections and the appointment of a new government, it offered a rare chance to hear directly from the newly elected Prime Minister and cabinet ministers on their priorities.

See full agenda and speaker list at the MEF website

A Bold New Framework: The 5D Development Policy

Prime Minister Zandanshatar G. opened the forum by unveiling the 5D Development Policy, a ten-year strategy built on five pillars:

  • Doubling the size of the economy
  • Doubling the area of green zones
  • Doubling renewable energy capacity
  • Strengthening macroeconomic stability
  • Accelerating digital transformation

What stood out wasn’t just the ambition, but the clarity: each pillar came with measurable targets.

In what might have been a symbolic gesture to international stakeholders, the Prime Minister conducted his one-on-one policy dialogue session entirely in English — signaling openness and accessibility to foreign investors. Though his English was not flawless — at times repeating similar phrases, sidestepping varied questions, or responding with “I do not want to answer that” — the effort to engage in English itself sent a deliberate message of international orientation.

Legal Clarity, Investor Confidence, and Mega Projects

Investor confidence was a central theme of this year’s MEF. One of the keynote speeches focused specifically on restoring and securing investor trust in Mongolia — a timely and necessary topic, though not a new one. The phrase “Mongolia is open for business” has been repeated by nearly every administration since 2012, and for many, it has lost credibility. Deputy Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor directly acknowledged this skepticism, admitting that the long-promised Foreign Investment Law has been discussed at every forum for over a decade, without result. “I’m now embarrassed to talk about it,” he said, candidly. He pledged that the law would be approved by next year’s forum — and added, only half-jokingly, that if not, there may be no Mongolia Economic Forum to speak at.

Khurelbaatar Bulgantuya, Deputy Chairwoman of the State Great Khural, reaffirmed the government’s commitment to legal stability. Deputy Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor emphasized that 14 mega projects initiated by the previous administration would not be shelved. Instead, the government has ranked them using four categories and 14 evaluation criteria. In practice, this means that five projects are actively moving forward, other five will not require funding from the state budget and will find investors, while the remaining four projects have been deferred.

Energy Sector Pivot and Public-Private Momentum

Since 2024, the government has accelerated reforms in the energy sector, with a clear pivot toward green growth. Priorities include expanding renewable energy, building data centers, and setting a path to export energy by 2030.However, skepticism remains — particularly regarding Energy Minister Choijilsuren, whose position appears at odds with the broader reform narrative promoted by other members of the new cabinet. For many in the international community, this inconsistency raises questions about whether the sector’s ambitious goals are truly credible or politically supported at the highest levels.

One of the most notable developments was the volume of public-private partnership (PPP) agreements signed during the Forum. Both public and private actors echoed a shared commitment to leveraging PPP models to accelerate infrastructure and industrial transformation. MEF made it clear that PPPs will be a central mechanism moving forward.

Sovereign Wealth Fund on the Launchpad

The newly established Chinggis Khan Sovereign Wealth Fund — established only last year and with a new CEO appointed 6 months ago — has already joined the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, adopting global governance and transparency standards.

This places Mongolia’s latest effort alongside longstanding funds such as the Future Heritage Fund and Fiscal Stability Fund, which were created in the 2000s but faced criticism for inconsistent governance. The fund now comprises three accounts — Future Heritage, Development, and Savings, all of which, as stated by the CEO, will be administered and co-managed by the corresponding Ministries.

So, is this fund more credible? It appears so, at least structurally. Unlike earlier iterations, this fund is underpinned by recent legislation, a multi-tiered internal structure, membership in the IF SWF, and real digital transparency measures like E‑Mongolia integration. While it’s still early in its lifecycle, these features signal a more robust and sincere attempt to channel Mongolia’s resource wealth into sustainable, long-term public benefit.

Economic Diversification & Critical Minerals

With 95% of Mongolia’s exports still tied to raw materials, economic diversification is not optional — it’s urgent. Of course, this has been the narrative for well over a decade, with little structural change to show for it. In that familiar context, critical minerals received heightened attention at the forum. Globally, over 30 countries have now issued national strategies on critical minerals. From one panel discussion, it was suggested that Mongolia’s Critical Minerals List will be updated and prioritized to better align with global clean-tech supply chains.

Whether this will amount to more than rhetoric remains to be seen. The ambition is there — but credibility will hinge on whether Mongolia can deliver on standards for sustainability, governance, and transparency that investors and strategic partners increasingly expect.

Sustainability Momentum: COP17 on the Horizon

Another milestone: Mongolia will host COP17 in 2026. This represents a landmark opportunity for Mongolia to step onto the global climate diplomacy stage — with leadership on sustainability, green finance, and energy transition. It’s also a powerful way to convene new partnerships around climate-smart growth — an issue I care deeply about.

Organizers Connecting the Dots

A big round of applause is due to Ganhuyag Chuluun Hutagt, Altangunii Jargalan, Undral Amarsaikhan, and the MEF team. Their leadership, honed over more than a decade of organizing this forum, was on full display this year. The agenda was coherent, ambitious, and action-oriented.

Final Reflections

Coming back from Canada to Mongolia means witnessing something crucial: I can feel the shift. There’s genuine momentum, clarity, and ambition — a buzz not unlike in other fast-moving emerging markets.

Unlike forums of the past, MEF 2025 wasn’t just about promises. It was about execution. With the 5D policy framework, critical minerals strategy, energy and digital pivots, mega projects under review, PPPs gaining traction, and COP17 on the horizon — we’re not just talking about transformation. We’re laying the groundwork for it.

As someone returning with international experience, I feel more determined than ever to contribute to this momentum. Mongolia is at a crossroads — and I’m happy to be home for it.

About Zolzaya

Zolzaya Jargalsaikhan, MBA, is a recent graduate of the University of British Columbia. She has consulted on recycling, climate, and energy transition projects in Canada and Mongolia, and previously worked in Mongolia’s capital markets for seven years.

Posted in Business, Economics, Policy, Sovereign Wealth Fund, Zolzaya Jargalsaikhan | Leave a comment